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Abstract: Alessandro Ferrara’s conception of Democratic Horizon provides an 
innovative normative framework to address the challenge of hyperpluralism for an 
updated political liberalism. This project however, takes the fact of hyperpluralism as a 
given, disconnected from the global political context that leads to the emergence of this 
phenomenon. In particular, (1) the paper asks if liberal democracies have a duty to enlarge 
their polities through new constituent assembles and supranational organizations, or if 
accession of new polities should be conceived as a matter of national interest among 
interested parties. Paradoxically, (2) the paper defends the thesis that resort to conjectural 
argumentation that helps accommodate internal cultural diversity cannot justify 
supranational integration in normative terms or a transnational fusion of horizons. As an 
alternative, (3) the paper explores the notion of “conjectural space” for fair bargaining 
formation among interested parties. Additionally, (4) it also argues that the “ethos of 
openness” that supports the Democratic Horizon is unnecessarily constrained by a statist 
model of global governance. This model is still unjustifiably tied to the representation of 
national interests irrespective of population size or competing transnational interests.  
[Keywords: Conjectural Argumentation, Bargaining, Supranational Organization, 
Hyperpluralism, International Legitimacy] 
Introduction 
Ferrara’s Democratic Horizon (henceforth DH) is a political conception that mirrors and 
adapts the approach to peaceful coexistence in the international society and projects it 
into democratic communities. These contemporary polities however, are characterized by 
a degree of deep pluralism that defies containment within the canonical limits of Rawls’s 
political liberalism.1 This DH addresses this emerging hyperpluralism but does not 
question its roots and causes. The paper examines the validity and limits of Ferrara’s 
conjectural approach for the creation of hyperpluralist communities through accession, 
and deep integration in international organizations. 
                                                                                                                                               
 
1 A. Ferrara, The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
     
 





In particular, the paper focuses on the practice of conjectural argumentation as an 
auxiliary tool in this transition for the incorporation of outsiders and internal dissenters. 
This argumentative approach represents an interesting alternative to regimes of “liberal 
domination,” where the hegemonic conception of secular toleration is imposed on 
incorporated minorities. There are however, some important questions regarding the 
incorporation of conjectural argumentation in an expanded conception of a DH.  
On the one hand, this bold reconceptualization of political liberalism is presented 
as a response to the new scenarios of hyperpluralism that exceed the traditional 
conception of the liberal democratic polity. On the other hand, this deep pluralism is taken 
for granted, as “homegrown dissent.” Regular migrants using official channels are 
supposed to “vote with their feet,” so it is their duty to develop the cultural 
accommodations within the overlapping consensus. Subnational groups are the subject of 
a very sophisticated and differentiated literature of minority rights and multicultural 
citizenship. Who is then the new subject of conjectural argumentation? In my view, 
Ferrara’s conception of a DH would benefit from some social theory explaining the 
process behind the emergence of this new hyperpluralism. My conjecture, if I may, is that 
this is better explained through a stronger connection with chapter seven (“Beyond the 
Nation: Governance and Deliberative Democracy”). In its internal architecture, it seems 
as if this reflection on global and transnational governance institutions is disconnected 
from the main proposal on multivariate democracies. This seems to me a missed 
opportunity to give the ethos of democratic openness the proper horizon for our global 
times. Additionally, connecting hyperpluralism with global governance provides an 
explanatory account of the evolving supranational framework of our political world and 
its effects on the increasing pluralization of national democracies; and adds a normative 
account of the terms of the incorporation into a shared institutional order. For instance, 
we need to specify if there is a universal imperative of integration based on the ethos of 
openness, or a duty of assistance to incorporate new members into the society of well-
ordered peoples, or a pragmatic political agreement to join a cooperative enterprise, or 
accession terms based on mutual benefit.  
Conversely, these functional supranational institutions and normative regimes 
also frame the terms in which the other is incorporated in the realm of public reason, and 
     
 





the constitutive rules that apply in each case: Is she owed recognition as refugee, as guest-
worker, as cooperative partner, as fellow European citizen, as co-national? 
Conjecturing convergence 
The standard mode of political justification of public authority in contexts of reasonable 
doctrinal pluralism is a common pool of shared, constitutive principles. This overlapping 
consensus is a weak form of agreement because the shared set of principles is not 
supported by the same reasons, premises and arguments. This reasonable consensus is 
affirmed by the right reasons, that is, they all belong to the same type of reasons –that is, 
the moral subset. In contrast to other cognitivist models of strong consensus, political 
liberalism gives up with the hope of reaching a single chain of arguments that could be 
affirmed univocally by all reasonable citizens. A public conception of justice is affirmed 
from different belief-systems that share a common core of principles. This common core 
is supported by all reasonable doctrines but it does not depend on any singular one for its 
validation. Therefore, it is perceived as consistent with any particular reasonable 
perspective while it is seen as an independent and freestanding conception from a general 
point of view. 
Conjecture on the other hand, differs from public reason in that it does not start 
from supported premises. Here one party approaches the other from an alternative 
reconstruction of the other’s belief-system but this new articulation is not supported by 
this external agent. The structure of the process can be summarized the following way: 
(1) You believe in X, I believe in Y and we agree that X is incompatible with Y. 
(2) I do not believe in X but I believe that Xb is a reasonable interpretation of X that is 
compatible with Y. (3) I believe that it is consistent with X to support Xb and to embrace 
Y, although I do not believe in X or Xb. 
This stage of deliberation does not occur within the boundaries of shared public 
reasons. It operates only within the grounds of a not-fully-reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine. The other party is addressed through the subset of familiar interpretations within 
the conceptual space of her belief-system. Therefore, this process takes place entirely in 
a domain of non-public reasons. The point of the exchange is, however, the incorporation 
of the outsider into the realm of reasonability that makes possible reciprocal and public 
     
 





justification of public authority. As Rawls says, it strengthens the ideal of public reason 
although it is important to have in mind that conjecture itself is not public reason. It is an 
important accessory tool for the inclusion of the other in an institutional setting where 
disputes are to be resolved and political authority justified by appeal to shared political 
values that have priority over non-political doctrines. 
The arrival to this convergence is a historical process of constitutional agreement 
through which citizens learn to modify their comprehensive doctrines in a way that is 
compatible with the priority of the impartial view of the shared political conception, and 
incorporate this primacy in their own views. This process of political decentering is not 
fully explained by Rawls. It is presented as an aspiration and a particular experience of 
historical learning of a transition from a modus vivendi of coexistence to the discovery of 
the moral value of a political regime of liberal toleration. The case for the Democratic 
Peace can also be read as the product of historical learning. According to this thesis, 
democratic citizens are fully aware that military conflicts are against their individual 
interests and the commercial and collaborative practices established across borders. 
Therefore, once they have learnt about the value of peaceful coexistence, they promote 
any political means of conflict resolution and leave military action as a desperate last 
resort. As a consequence, they learn to value truly representative regimes, institutional 
transparency and accountability. 
Engaging in conjecture 
The expectation of impartiality in a conjectural approach leads to two main difficulties 
regarding its legitimacy in practice. First, Rawls stipulates that the motives of the 
incorporation must be made explicit in order to avoid any manipulation, and this 
precondition seems to exclude non-moral reasons to engage into conjectural approach. 
Second, a belief-system may contain different subsets of plausible interpretations 
compatible with the conception of public reason. Each one has different integration costs 
for both parties. Favoring one over the others may reflect a selection bias and conflict 
with the impartiality of public reason.  
In the Rawlsian model of political integration through affirmation of the political 
conception of justice, we only need one comprehensive doctrine to be true to grant that 
     
 





all the overlapping rest converge on a right political conception of justice. But the problem 
with the selection bias is not whether the favored version adulterates the content of the 
resulting overlapping consensus (in a contextual, empirical reading). The problem is 
whether the selection influences a self-interpretation of the doctrine in terms more 
convenient to the adhesion process without due respect for the integrity of the belief-
system.  
Therefore, we have two interrelated problems. On the one hand, we need to 
establish what counts as a valid motive to seek the accommodation of an outsider within 
a shared regime. On the other hand, we need to determine what are the moral limits to the 
re-interpretation of a belief-system and what acceptable trade-offs between expediency 
and the integrity of a culture.  
In the first case, the motivation for accommodating accession can spring from a 
duty of justice, from pragmatic considerations or from exploitative interests. If we 
examine the topic under the Rawlsian framework we find that Rawls explicitly forbids 
manipulative or strategic considerations from the conjectural approach.2 Explicitly, in The 
Law of Peoples Rawls condemns intrusive or pressing conditionalities from liberal 
peoples and international organizations to promote liberalizing changes in decent but non 
liberal societies.3 That would violate the value of liberal toleration towards others in 
foreign policy. There is however a deeper degree of engagement in the cases of burdened 
societies. This implies a commitment to institutional change in order to create the social 
conditions for political autonomy and self-government, which, in Rawls’s view, relies on 
the domestic political culture. The motivation, however, is intrinsically moral, based on 
a duty of justice, the duty of assistance, the promotion of the value of political 
independence, and the goal of expanding the number of bona-fide candidates to join the 
society of well-ordered societies. These are all intrinsic goods. It may very well be that 
the promotion of these goals through the international community clashes with the short 
term commercial interests of some liberal nations that may prefer benevolent absolutisms 
or other totalitarian regimes as commercial partners. Liberal democracies however, have 
                                                                                                                                               
 
2 J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1999, p. 155-156. 
3 Ibid. p. 122-123. 
     
 





the duty to point to conjectural reinterpretations of the other’s political culture that are 
conducive to greater representativeness and political independence. 
Conjecture, accession and transnational integration 
One may consider that, if Rawlsian liberal internationalism defends a duty to engage in 
conjectural argumentation to provide assistance to reform foreign institutions and 
political culture, and if the conception of the DH promotes an ethos of openness regarding 
internal hyperpluralism, then liberal citizens should develop a positive disposition to 
accept foreign proposals of transnational integration, and to engage in conjectural 
argumentation to facilitate convergence. 
In contrast, if the EU is a club with a sovereign right of admission and no duty to 
incorporate neighboring countries, then there is no need to discuss conjectural strategies 
to facilitate the accession of Islamist regimes that may differ regarding the Copenhagen 
criteria of democratic governance, free markets and human rights observance. Members 
may think that theirs is a private club and that internal regulations are non-public reasons 
for outsiders. Members may think that their duty to facilitate integration is limited to their 
already internal minorities and that the duty to engage in conjectural interpretations is 
justified by imperatives of political stability, promoting the transition from a modus 
vivendi acceptance to a fully moral integration. 
Between these two poles, we can consider intermediate cases where the EU may 
have pragmatic reasons to extend membership to their neighbors. In fact, the European 
project is an example of normative transition from a common market and economic 
community to a more ambitious – and admittedly problematic, political project. Let’s 
imagine that the EU needs to access a promising Turkish market and to attract its young 
and highly skilled workforce. This time Turkey is reluctant to accept the invitation 
because some EU regulations would conflict with the prevailing Islamist conception. The 
EU expert committee may suggest some Islamist democratic reforms that would be in 
line with the EU public reason. Even if the real motivation of the EU is manifest and 
sincere in its pragmatic interest, we may hold doubts regarding the reasonability of the 
accession.  
     
 





The Rawlsian paradigm is at crossroads here. One the one hand we have to admit 
that here conjecture goes hand in hand with conditionality, and that even if the changes 
are accepted, the Turkish population would accept the European policies as a commercial 
partner, with a larger degree of disaffection and a growing sense of self-alienation. That 
would still count as accession for non-public reasons. On the other hand, we have to admit 
that this is frequently the engine that moves realistic utopias in history, as the European 
example testifies. Therefore, rational pragmatic reasons could open the way to reasonable 
transformations in the long run. Rawls faces the internal problem in his theory that, in 
order to keep the doctrine independent from comprehensive commitments, the process of 
arrival to a political overlapping consensus cannot be developed as part of the theory. The 
commitment to the fact of pluralisms means that every reasonable doctrine has to walk 
its own path, back and forth to the consensus. There is no single argumentative way to be 
replicated in all heads with identical results. We are left with the hope that a Hegelian 
cunning of reason could keep hand in hand rational interests and reasonable 
accommodations.  
An additional problem that Rawls faces in these scenarios is that his model 
assumes an explicit circularity. The Overlapping Consensus is freestanding because it can 
be affirmed simultaneously and independently by all reasonable doctrines, while the 
doctrines that compromise the support of the public conception of justice had already 
been considered unreasonable and excluded from the process. In the case of the EU, for 
instance, the EU members themselves define the content of the very vague and general 
Copenhagen criteria. Who counts as a sufficiently democratic people is defined by a club 
of mostly Christian and secular western societies. Rawls himself assumes that liberal 
democratic societies depend on and reflect particular elements from their background 
culture. With these premises in mind, it is difficult to imagine that the political consensus 
would not carry some of these ethical particularities and that the criteria for normalizing 
accession would not replicate some of these particular histories. If we analyze again the 
hypothetical dialogue over the admission of Turkey through conjecture we may find that 
the accommodation of “Islamic democracy” depends in part on the interpretation of 
secular and Christian democracy, although the terms of accession are presented in a 
formally freestanding way. 
     
 





A Habermasian reading of the process demands stronger conditions for consensus 
on all parties, through arguments that are equally compelling to all sides. The resulting 
conception is impartial but not freestanding in the Rawlsian way. In fact, the final product 
presents a heavier doctrinal commitment. On the other side, and contrary to Rawls, the 
conception is more flexible and reflexive, and more equally demanding on all parties. 
There is no a priori exclusion of unreasonable doctrines because there is no pre-judgment 
of the competence of the parties prior to the deliberative procedure. Linguistic 
competence itself is a presupposition of communicative rationality. This same rationality 
and the expectative of consensus through the force of the strongest argument suffice for 
the reflective determination of the democratic credentials of all parties. This means that 
conjecture may work both ways, because EU member states may realize that their 
democracies are very partial realizations of an ideal, that are exposed to Turkish 
criticisms, and that they should also reflexively revise their credentials. 
Conjectural space 
Following a Habermasian framework, however, we should exclude strategic approaches 
to accession. If with Rawls we had to rely on the cunning of reason to reconcile the 
realistic and utopian poles of the project, with Habermas we seem to admit an implicit 
duty of integration towards any interested party. However, the Habermasian approach 
does not always provide enough resources to bridge the gap between interested parties 
that lack enough common ground in shared values. For instance, the stark distinction 
between strategic and communicative reason constitutes a severe limitation in the 
complex scenarios of real world hyperpluralism. This deep reluctance towards the 
language of interests and bargain leads Habermas to dismiss the logic of fair compromise 
formation as a second best alternative to the demanding normativity of communicative 
reason.4  
                                                                                                                                               
 
4 See for instance Habermas’s discussion of Jon Elster’s work on Constituent Assemblies in Between 
Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, Cambridge, MA, MIT 
Press, 1998, pp. 165-168, 337-339. 
     
 





Joseph Heath develops a very interesting criticism to Habermas, raising and 
exploring this particular line of reasoning.5 In particular, Heath argues that Habermas fails 
to identify the normative grounds in the original rational choice project. In this 
reconstruction, bargaining can be added as a possible way to overcome scenarios where 
there is less than enough common ground for agreement. Importantly, Heath still 
differentiates between bargaining and strategic action, banning manipulative approaches 
that subsume other agents into a means-end relation, but accepting bargaining as a method 
to identify points of equilibrium and of justified satisfaction of individual expectancies 
where communicative deliberation failed to bridge intractable gaps in value and interest 
interpretation. The original conception of rational choice bargaining the Heath rescues is 
a normative one, which rests on some axiomatic characterization of the actors and their 
rule abiding behavior.6 It is therefore a description of rational players that is operate in a 
frame of reasonability but that provides some rational fall-back rules in case of strategic 
breach of agreements.7 This approach is interesting because it makes explicit that 
discourse modes like conjecture cannot be thought just as deliberative alternatives to 
bargaining. The resort to conjecture from interested parties may carry forms of strategic 
reasoning if the intentionality motivating the agreement is not made explicit, or if the 
intentional approach is limited to a single option within a larger set of candidates. Andrew 
March, for instance, clarifies that his approach to conjectural accommodation does not 
aim to demonstrate the correct solution to a doctrinal accommodation problem. He 
explicitly declares that his reconstructive project is limited to show that there are 
“plausible” alternatives that could satisfy both parties’ standards.8 
We should add that in order to satisfy the condition of sincerity, the approaching 
party should also reveal the full set of alternative interpretations that she thinks are 
compatible with the other’s doctrine, even if some of them lead even further from the 
                                                                                                                                               
 
5 J. Heath, Communicative Action and Rational Choice, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2001, pp. 219-
253. 
6 Ibid., pp. 248-249. 
7 “Furthermore, agents who disagree over which specific norm should regulate their interactions may 
nevertheless agree on a default norm that should apply in case they fail. In this case, the disagreement point 
is normatively fixed, and so would be insensitive to changes in the relative strength of the parties” (Ibid., 
p. 250). 
8 A. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2009, pp. 71-73. 
     
 





point of agreement. This reconstructive exercise is also more consistent with the 
declaration that the approaching party still does not share or support the set of alternative 
interpretations. For instance, Ferrara presents different exercises of conjecture that 
illustrate how the approach could be developed when applied to different religious and 
cultural traditions. They, of course, are not presented as the only valid reconstruction, 
which leaves us with the difficult task of elaborating criteria for ranking alternatives.  
Heath’s critique makes sense in this case because it points out that conjecture in 
practice could be closer to strategic reasoning than bargaining. If negotiations could be 
translated into bargaining terms where motivations and benefits for both parties are fully 
disclosed (sincerity rule) and agreements are being represented as points of multiple 
equilibria, then we could find a modus vivendi on a higher moral ground. Therefore, I 
think that to avoid illegitimate persuasive and rhetorical intentions we should avoid 
talking about “conjectural argumentation” and instead of “conjectural space”. By 
conjectural space, I understand the conceptual space internal to a doctrine that allows 
alternative interpretations of its own value constellation, in different degrees of proximity 
to the ideal of public reason affirmed by the approaching party. 
Conjecture and representation 
The definition of a conjectural space for integration leads us to two related problems. 
First, we need to determine how to assess the degree of legitimacy and support of different 
value-constellations in a single conjectural space. Outsiders rarely have the epistemic 
authority to determine the degree of congruence and fidelity that divergent traditions 
have, or even if there is a factual divorce between orthodoxy and popular belief and 
practice.9 This is the very question that Seyla Benhabib examines in her defense of a 
human right to democracy.10 Benhabib discusses this question in relation to the proposals 
for minimalism about human rights and their translation into local membership rights. 
                                                                                                                                               
 
9 M. Schwartzman, “The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture”, Journal of Moral Philosophy, 9 (2012), 
4, pp. 521-544. Notice that March analysis is focused in the case of the Islamic community and its concrete 
doctrinal and textualist traditions. The view that I defend assumes the individual right to re-appropriate the 
tradition and privileges and privileges the final view of the individual over other expert bodies in the 
discursive community. See A. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship, cit., pp. 73-74. 
10 S. Benhabib, “Is there a Human Right to Democracy? Beyond Interventionism and Indifference”, in 
his Dignity in Adversity. Human Rights in Troubled Times, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011. 
     
 





Objectors to a human right to democracy argue that this would be a maximalist standard 
that would violate the integrity of many cultural traditions that are decent enough to be 
protected from external disruptive demands. Minimalism about human rights defends that 
many normative traditions content meaningful cultural resources that express ideals of 
respect and recognition to basic demands from their members. Therefore, external 
pressure should be limited to promote the kind of “creative adaptations” necessary to 
secure that the basic interests of all individuals are taken into account, even if not all 
members are given equal consideration. The language of conjectural argumentation may 
overlap with this recourse to cultural “creative adaptations” when the ideal of public 
reason comprises human rights standards. But lacking any internal assessment and 
validation, we do not have any guarantee of the legitimacy of all the different adaptations 
of a basic list of human rights. The only way to validate that a range of creative 
adaptations is consistent with the ideal of basic respect to all members of the political 
community is through an entitlement to equal political participation in the contextual 
elaboration of the list. Therefore, understood as democratic iterations, the concept of 
human rights becomes a local realization of a moral principle. 
Lacking proper democratic representation or legitimate consultation, we cannot 
estimate the legitimacy or support of the different alternatives within the conjectural 
space. Additionally, even when we have a reliable estimation of popular support we 
would also need a criterion to establish our preferences regarding the range of conjectural 
alternatives. At this point is where conjectural deliberation should prevent illegitimate 
selection bias. For instance, let’s imagine that we are discussing the accession of a 
Confucian society, with a firm traditional adhesion to communal values and 
responsibilities and a paternalistic and meritocratic political system. 
Jiang Qing’s Confucian Constitutionalism promotes the rule of law against the 
unchecked and arbitrary abuses of a single party system.11 This reform proposal combines 
three deliberative chambers that represent the demos (House of the People), the national 
peoples (House of the Nation), and a senate of Confucian and other recognized scholars 
(House of the Scholars). The system is designed to guarantee stability and continuity with 
                                                                                                                                               
 
11 J. Qing, A Confucian Constitutional Order. How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2013. 
     
 





the ideal of a historical civilization through time. It emphasizes the value of harmony 
through a dialogue between popular demands, recognition of internal diversity, and unity 
through the reinterpretation of a traditional and comprehensive system of values. In 
certain way, this reform tracks the British system, with a Parliament elected by universal 
suffrage, an hereditary chamber rooted in the different cultural belongings, and a 
symbolic monarchy that in this case emerges from a senate of spiritual leaders and that 
embodies the Confucian spirit. 
Joseph Chan reconstructs a conception of Confucian Political Perfectionism that 
presents Confucianism as a form of moderate perfectionism.12 In this proposal the 
purpose of the political system is not to implement a comprehensive doctrine but to create 
the institutional environment in which the specific goods and values that constitute the 
Confucian view of the good life (Dao) can be facilitated and promoted so all citizens can 
incorporate them in their different comprehensive views. Confucian perfectionist 
judgments about the good life are presented as independent and multipurpose primary 
goods (arts, knowledge, family life, social relationships; and virtues like benevolence, 
courage and practical wisdom), and the liberal democratic system as the best instrumental 
regime in non-ideal conditions for the meritocratic selection of public authorities. Chan 
nevertheless supplements these liberal democratic institutions with a second chamber, a 
senate of non-elected exemplary civil servants that monitors the ethos of public service 
of elected politicians. He however admits that the language of human rights and claim-
rights in general needs to be limited to some basic civil and political rights, more 
explicitly, those necessary to point to situations of insufficient public concern.  
Sungmoon Kim, for instance, defends the compatibility of democracy and 
Confucian culture.13 Confucian Democracy is deeply embedded in the background 
culture and this in turn generates a particular Confucian public reason, articulated in the 
arguments and values expressed by ordinary citizens when discussing political issues. 
This variety of public reason also motivates citizens to extend the affective familial moral 
                                                                                                                                               
 
12 J. Chan, Confucian Perfectionism: A Political Philosophy for Modern Times, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2013. 
13 S. Kim, Confucian Democracy in East Asia. Theory and Practice, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2014. 
     
 





sentimentalist of Confucian citizens to a receptive attitude towards the plight of minorities 
in an increasingly pluralistic society. 
We have three candidates in the Confucian conjectural space. One possible 
transformation would emphasize the constitutionalization of the political system. A 
second alternative would adopt most of the institutions of the liberal democratic state as 
instrumental means for the provision of Confucian goods without an official 
comprehensive doctrine. A third alternative would strengthen the role of a vibrant 
Confucian background culture and an active civil society that would substantiate its 
values through a democratic state. The initiating party should make explicit not only its 
intention but also the reasons to favor one option over the others as bona-fide neighbor, 
cooperative party, etc. Some of the options may be more consistent with the political 
expression of their social and cultural creativity while other would facilitate an easier 
international integration. 
When the terms of integration in the global order are conditioned on conjectural 
interpretations, only some degree of democratic ratification can protect the population 
from internal self-alienation. 
A horizon of global governance 
Ferrara’s discussion of global governance focuses on justifying its legitimacy through the 
lenses of deliberative democracy. In contrast to democratic government, a regime of 
institutional governance does not rely on a legitimate account of coercive power. 
Governance institutions lack strong enforcing capabilities and therefore depend on 
reaching wider consensus through more persuasive reasons. Functional global and 
transnational institutions play an important role in providing the kinds of goods and 
services that no single actor could achieve on its own in comparable conditions. Their 
place in the global architecture is justified through expert knowledge and technical 
reasons that optimize common goals. It is therefore a common criticism to identify global 
governance institutions with the rise of technocratic structures that exhibit a democratic 
deficit and lack proper political legitimacy. It is experts who are the authors of the rules 
and not the citizens that are subjected to them. According to Ferrara, a conception of 
deliberative democracy helps us understand that this is a category mistake. When we 
     
 





project the standards of authorial legitimacy to complex and partial coordinating 
institutions we are replicating the same argument that questions the legitimacy of modern 
representative democracies in comparison to Athenian direct participation. The 
transnational coordinating agency lacks any monopoly of coercive power, instead it only 
retains the monopoly of attribution of legitimacy to the actions of the coordinated actors, 
backed by the consensual agreement of the parties. In Ferrara’s view, the perception of a 
deficit in legitimacy is produced by the projection of a statist standard that is inadequate 
for the nature of the political entity at hand. In contrast, a system of global non-coercive 
governance, supplemented with strengthened accountability and solid consensus about 
constitutional essentials, may produce richer democratic conditions at all levels.14 In my 
view, this deliberative account of global governance is still unnecessarily conservative. 
We could say that it betrays the innovative ethos of openness of the DH because, at the 
end, it justifies the global regime in functional terms relative to domestic conditions. The 
standard of legitimacy is still a statist one, although merely supplemented by an 
institutional environment that provides better enabling conditions. As presented, global 
governance is a part of the constitutive framework of state government. One may argue 
that this account replicates the same category mistake that fails to capture the very 
distinctive nature of the emerging global order in its own terms. 
What is problematic in the emerging order is that even if the growing constellation 
of functional transnational organizations embed human rights standards in their mandate 
or implement greater accountability, these are still very specific and partial areas of 
regulation. We still lack an overarching deliberative space in which the competing partial 
discourses can be reinterpreted and prioritized according to a view that is coextensive to 
the scope of the demos subjected to its regulatory power, and which exceeds the national 
terms of representation.  
The conception of a state-based DH is a remarkable reformulation of the ideal of 
political liberalism before the challenge of a growing hyperplurality. Unfortunately, it 
does not adequately address the sources of this emerging problem in the current 
conditions of our global institutional order. A more realistic understanding of the DH 
                                                                                                                                               
 
14 A. Ferrara, The Democratic Horizon, cit., ch. 7. 
     
 





would connect the main sources of hyperpluralism in democratic communities with a 
foreign origin, through porous borders, supranational integration, accession, etc. This 
larger institutional horizon helps explain the conditions of wealth inequality, health 
inequity, migration flows, persistent poverty, religious persecution, child labor, 
environmental degradation, and human rights violation that drive the pluralization of 
modern democracies. Conversely, the deeply asymmetric terms in which different 
peoples are integrated in the institutions of global governance also determine the 
categories in which hyperplurality is recognized in our DHs. 
Conclusion 
The paper defends the need to connect the problem of hyperpluralism in multivariate 
democracies with the larger horizon of global governance. Conjectural argumentation 
emerges as a promising resource for the incorporation, integration and accession of 
different peoples into shared orders of public reason. The paper argues however, that the 
conjectural approach implies an asymmetrically situated intentional actor that operates 
against a larger background of conjectural alternatives. Therefore, proper respect to the 
agency and integrity of the approached party demands the articulation of guarantees that 
the selected cultural reinterpretation is sufficiently representative; and that the pragmatic 
balance of interest in play have been made explicit in the conjectural space. In the first 
case, we defend de compatibility of the conjectural approach with a defense of a human 
right to democracy that grants the participation of the affected parties in their collective 
self-understanding. In the second case, we defend the rehabilitation of normative 
bargaining as a more realistic approach to processes of integration among interested 
parties. This approach is especially relevant to make sense of the balance of cooperative 
reasons in our global system, where a party joins an order of public reason under some 
specific terms: as a cooperative partner, as the subject of human rights, as an equal citizen, 
etc. Therefore, the paper stresses the need to connect this external dimension of global 
governance within a more tightly unified and open conception of the DH.  
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